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Fuel Cycles and Proliferation
By Dovile Vilkauskaite
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The nuclear fuel cycle refers to treatment of waste from nuclear power reactors. The difference between the open and closed fuel cycles is the treatment of spent nuclear fuel(SNF) once the fuel has already gone through a reactor and been used for energy production.
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Open Fuel Cycle
Spent fuel from a reactor is treated as waste in the open fuel cycle. The U.S. currently uses this practice to dispose of waste from nuclear energy production due to its lower proliferation riskPlutonium that could be used for a weapon is left in spent nuclear fuel which contains highly radioactive materials. The Plutonium is mixed with other waste which would prove lethal for anyone attempting to steal it. The chart below is from a blog titled, “New Nuclear Power in the United States,” which provides a good overview of the open nuclear fuel cycle.[1]
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U.S. policy discourages reprocessing, thereby advocating for the open fuel cycle, and requires advance consent to allow other states to reprocess spent fuel under the Atomic Energy Act, section 123a.[2] This policy dates back to President Carter who discouraged reprocessing of spent fuel and led the world by example with abandoning the technology in 1977.[3] Administrations after Carter continued with the same viewpoint that reprocessing is a proliferation risk because it separates out plutonium from inherently self-protecting hazardous waste. In 1993, President Clinton echoed President Carter’s sentiments and issued a policy statement stating that the U.S. does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and engagement in plutonium reprocessing.[4]
An issue that proponents of the closed fuel cycle always point to is the question of what to do with the spent nuclear fuel once it’s been utilized for energy. Geologic depositories are required for permanent storage of high level nuclear waste. According to James Acton in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, citizens understandably have a “visceral objection to turning their state into a nuclear dump. Some also believe that countries should deal with their own waste—a form of the polluter pays principle.”[5] Yet the open fuel cycle keeps fissile material safer. Keeping Plutonium in a highly radioactive spent fuel pool makes it much more difficult to steal, and thus keeps it from being misused. In the same article, James Acton describes South Korea’s pyroprocessing developments that are bolstered by claims of proliferation resistance as facing a “growing consensus among scientific experts…that the technical, intrinsic aspects of proliferation resistance have been significantly oversold.” Advanced reprocessing technologies resolve none of these objections.”[6]
Closed Fuel Cycle
In a closed fuel cycle, spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed, and useful elements like Plutonium are extracted to be recycled for nuclear energy. This can be done by turning it into MOX fuel at a MOX fabrication plant. Originally, reprocessing technology was seen as a way to combat potential Uranium shortages that never materialized.[7] Countries like Japan and France invested heavily in the technology so they were unlikely to give it up despite the fact that separating Plutonium from hazardous waste leaves it vulnerable for diversion or theft.[8] Removing the remaining highly radioactive fission products in spent fuel increases the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.
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One East Asian country stands out as the exception to the U.S. strict controls over reprocessing capabilities. The U.S. extends long-term advance consent to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to Japan. Japan now plans to open its Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in 2018 that cost almost $20 billion to build and will process approximately 800 tonnes of used fuel per year.[9] The output of 8 tons of plutonium annually will be recycled into the closed fuel cycle. With reprocessing it is difficult to certify how much plutonium is extracted, creating dangerous accounting uncertainty. It would be easier for a state to covertly produce a nuclear weapon by only reporting 98% of the plutonium it extracts and save up the remaining 2% to make a bomb.
With only 4 kg of plutonium required to reach critical mass for a nuclear weapon, it is in the best interest of all living creatures to keep this material as difficult to obtain as possible. The U.S. does not protest Japan’s reprocessing capabilities likely because of Japan’s history of nonproliferation efforts, financial investment in reprocessing technology, and close ties with the United States after the end of World War II.[10] Japan accepts safeguards and engages in information exchanges with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as does South Korea.[11] Japan accepts expanded nonproliferation controls and transparency conditions as set up in their 1987 nuclear cooperation agreement, so the U.S. does not view Japan’s nuclear program, even though it entails reprocessing, as much of a proliferation concern.[12]
South Korea is also attempting to close its fuel cycle with the promise of more proliferation resistant technology. Pyroprocessing techniques researched by the U.S. Department of Energy and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) are seen as an advantage from a non-proliferation perspective because uranium, plutonium and other actinides are recovered together.[13] Even though this technology was developed in part by the U.S. Department of Energy, pyroprocessing is viewed as reprocessing by U.S. policy makers. Richard Stratford, an official in the State Department stated, “pyroprocessing is reprocessing. Period. Full stop.”[14] The U.S. has been reluctant to allow reprocessing to spread due to the global proliferation threat, which requires the U.S. to maintain its moratorium on the spread of reprocessing capabilities.
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Since the United States views the open fuel cycle as such a proliferation risk, section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act requires prior U.S. consent to reprocess nuclear materials obtained from the agreement.[15] This hinders reprocessing capabilities of non-nuclear weapons states.[16] While the U.S. advocates for the open fuel cycle due to proliferation concerns, President Bush’s National Energy Policy in 2001 included a recommendation for the U.S. to, “consider technologies with international partners with different fuel cycles to develop reprocessing technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.”[17] There is a future for the closed fuel cycle, although it will certainly be a contentious one with the nonproliferation community wary of “proliferation resistant” technologies.
Endnotes
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[1]To read a brief overview on the fuel, please see the “Open Fuel Cycle” and “Closed Fuel Cycle” pages on New Nuclear Power in the United States, https://newnuclearenergy.wordpress.com/nuclear-cycle-2/once-through-fuel-reactor/.
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[2]Paul Kerr, and Mary Beth Nikitin, "Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer" (CRS Report for Congress, Washington D.C., 2008), 1.
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[3]Mark Hibbs and Fred McGoldrick, "A Realistic and Effective Policy on Sensitive Nuclear Activities," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. October 15, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/15/realistic-and-effective-policy-on-sensitive-nuclear-activities/gqeu.
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[4] Anthony Andrews, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development (CRS Report No. RS22542) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22542.pdf.
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[5]James M. Acton, “The myth of proliferation-resistant technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, November/December 2009, vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 49–59.
[6]Ibid.
[7]Charles Fergusun, “Risks of Civilian Plutonium Programs,” July 1, 2004, NTI, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/risks-civilian-plutonium-programs/.
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[8]Kelsey Hartigan, Corey Hinderstein, Andrew Newman, and Sharon Sqassoni, A New Approach to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Best Practices for Security, Nonproliferation, and Sustainable Nuclear Energy, (Lanhan: Rowman & Littlefield, February 2015), 23-26.
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[9]“Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,” World Nuclear Association, November 2016, http://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx.
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[10] Jodi Lieberman, "Nonproliferation, Congress, and Nuclear Trade," Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 15, 2011, 8.
Ibid, 6.
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[11] Robert Einhorn and Kim Duyeon, "Will South Korea go nuclear?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 15, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/will-south-korea-go-nuclear9778.
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[12]“Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,” World Nuclear Association, November 2016, http://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx.
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[13]David Horner, “Pyroprocessing Is Reprocessing: U.S. Official,” Arms Control Association, April 4, 2011. https://www.armscontrol.org/print/4784.
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[14]“The U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 At a Glance,” Arms Control Association, March 2013, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/AEASection123.
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[15]Paul Kerr, and Mary Beth Nikitin, "Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer" (CRS Report for Congress, Washington D.C., 2008), 3.
[16]Anthony Andrews, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development (CRS Report No. RS22542) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 16, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22542.pdf.
