The new US-ROK 123 agreement opened the door to a ROK pathway to enrich and reprocess nuclear materials in the future by stating the NPT's "inalienable right" clause in the preamble. Do you think this signals a fundamental change of the U.S. nonproliferation policy?
South Korea wants to have enrichment and reprocessing options, and pressed for those many years. I think the Obama administration was very keen on showing the strength of alliance with somebody. And South Korea is not a bad choice. However, the agreement, in principle, says, we can allow you do this thing but don't count on it.
Instead of granting the right to reprocessing technology, the new 123 agreement allows the ROK an option to transfer the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to an approved 3rd party country. Is the United States willing to store the ROK’s SNF? If not the U.S., then who?
No, the U.S. is not willing to store and is not also allowed to store foreign countries' SNF.
It is conceivable that South Korea can have a discussion with [the] French. However, I think the contract for that is going to be expensive and muddy.
The long-term solution for South Korea in regards to SNF is to build the dry-cask storage. The dry-cask storage lasts about 100 years. It is a long time. After 100 years, put it in new casks. South Korea's entire SNF as casks can be stored in size of golf course.
Would the ROK import HEU from Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) countries for its nuclear-power submarine program? Does the United States have any diplomatic mechanism to prevent the ROK from importing HEU from NSG countries?
First, why nuclear submarine? Where do usually South Korean nuclear submarines operate? Well, they operate at closed and shallow seas around the Korean Peninsula. However, nuclear submarines are economic for deep and long-range operations in open seas. In theory, one can use a nuclear submarine in a closed and shallow sea but it will be uneconomic and risky to operate.
One reason why South Korea may want the nuclear submarine is to look stronger than Japan due to the two countries' historic rivalry. However, I think South Korea wants to have a nuclear submarine program so that it can eventually lead toward the uranium enrichment program for nuclear bomb option in the future.
If South Korea seeks to enrich the uranium or to import HEU from other countries, the U.S. can use its troop presence and security guarantee to restrain South Korea.
How does the United States define a country’s “nonproliferation track record?” Is it based on intention of a country? Possession or non-possession of weapon grade materials?
Political, absolutely political.
In your opinion, what is the biggest nonproliferation policy challenge for the United States in Northeast Asia? How can the United States overcome that challenge?
The biggest problem of East Asia is China. The regional rivalry between China and Japan can potentially lead to the proliferation domino effect in the region.