Evolving U.S. Nonproliferation Policy towards East Asia

The danger to U.S. nonproliferation policy in East Asia is the nuclearization of South Korea and Japan in response to an increasingly aggressive North Korea. Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, summed up the sentiment of North Korea’s nervous neighbors after a trilateral meeting with the U.S. and South Korea during the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit by saying, “North Korea's nuclear and missile capability is a direct and grave threat not only to all three countries but to the global community."[1] In order to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region, the U.S. has been providing reassurances of extended deterrence to South Korea and Japan. The U.S. also attempted to freeze North Korea’s progress in its nuclear weapons program through limited diplomatic outreach and by using the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions against North Korea. Thus far, U.S. extended deterrence, mutual defence treaties and military assurances to its East Asian allies have kept South Korea and Japan from developing nuclear weapons of their own. The U.S. provides reassurances during bilateral and multilateral talks and engages in joint military exercises. At the Japan-U.S.-Korea summit in 2016, President Obama, President Park, and Prime Minister Abe echoed the importance of trilateral cooperation. [2] After more nuclear and missile test launches by Pyongyang in 2016, the trilateral meeting at the Nuclear Security Summit between South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. showcased the Obama administration’s multilateral approach to maintaining stability in the region. This stability requires U.S. extended deterrence to US allies.

South Korea, North Korea’s richer and more technologically advanced neighbor, is a key U.S. ally in the region. South Korea remains a U.S. strategic partner in achieving its goals of nonproliferation and curbing North Korea’s aggression. Both countries engage in joint military exercises to showcase the strength of this partnership. Part of this military cooperation includes the deployment of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) to South Korea. In a July 7th news release, the Department of Defense stated the missiles were a “defensive measure to ensure the security of South Korea and that of its people, to protect alliance military forces from North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats.” [3]

However, the deployment of THAAD in the region has caused concerns in China, which views it as part of a broader attempt to encircle China in the Asia-Pacific. [4] Consequently, such attempts to deal with North Korea’s nuclear threat have caused tensions to escalate between China, the U.S., and its Asian allies. This is unfortunate as China’s cooperation is necessary to impose sanctions on North Korea, as it remains one of Pyongyang’s few allies. Without China’s cooperation, sanctions against North Korea are not fully implemented and Pyongyang continues to improve its nuclear weapons program.

The U.S. has to engage North Korea through diplomacy as well and used sanctions to try and stop their nuclear weapons program and prevent a threat to U.S. allies. The earliest attempts at diplomacy with North Korea during President Obama’s tenure were the Six Party Talks. They came to a premature end when Pyongyang walked out of negotiations in 2009.[5] In 2010, North Korea showcased its new uranium enrichment capability to visiting U.S. scientists, a clear signal of their commitment to pursue nuclear weapons despite international pressure to stop. [6] China attempted to revive the Six Party Talks[7], but the U.S. demands that North Korea begin to denuclearize before it will engage, which is highly unlikely at this point. Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, described the Obama administration’s method as “strategic patience in close consultations with our six party allies.” [8] Essentially this meant that the U.S. would hold off on restarting discussions with Pyongyang until the regime was prepared to denuclearize. However, hindsight shows us that strategic patience just gave North Korea more time to modernize its nuclear weapons and delivery capability.

The Obama administration tried to freeze North Korea’s weapons program diplomatically with the February 29th “Leap Day Agreement” in 2012 as well. The deal seemed promising with a new North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, agreeing to stop nuclear and long-range missile tests, as well as allowing international inspectors into the country, in exchange for 240,000 metric tons of U.S. food aid and heavy oil [9]. This bilateral meeting between the U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was intended to stop North Korea’s tests and secure Pyongyang's commitment to return to the path of denuclearization [10]. This glimmer of hope faded very quickly after it was announced due to North Korea's failed April 12, 2012 satellite launch [11].

Diplomatic outreach did not work and the U.S. promoted another round of sanctions that the UNSC unanimously adopted as Resolution 2087. The resolution strengthened previous UNSC resolutions 1817 and 1874, both prohibiting North Korea from conducting tests of any sort using ballistic missile technology [12]. Both UNSC Resolutions 1817 and 1874 had been ignored by Pyongyang. Once again, the U.S. was pushing for denuclearization while the young leader of North Korea had conflicting interests like gaining legitimacy within his own government, consolidating power, and showcasing his strength domestically, which would not include giving in to Washington’s demands that were perceived to be a security threat to North Korea [13].

In a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy in 2016, Daniel Russel, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that U.S. policy is grounded in deterrence, pressure, and diplomacy [14]. He continued that the U.S. “seeks to convince Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table and agree to complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.” [15]

While “strategic patience” has failed to negatively impact North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the administration has continued it until 2016.“Every single day that goes by, North Korea becomes a more and more acute threat to South Korea, Japan, countries in the region, and the US. And it gets closer to the day when it can actually put a nuclear weapon in an intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the continental US. That’s not acceptable for us,” US Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken said during a lecture at Seoul National University. [16] The U.S. has been successful however in reassuring its East Asian allies of the commitment to nonproliferation in the region. Even with North Korea’s aggressive actions, neither South Korean nor Japanese officials have moved towards weaponization.

Endnotes

[1] Jackson, David. “Obama Meets with Asian Leaders About North Korea Nuke Threat.” USA Today. March 31, 2016. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/03/31/obama-nuclear-security-summit-china-japan-south-korea-park-abe-xi/82458610/.

[2] "Remards by President Obama, President Park Geun-Hye of the Republic of Korea, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan After Trilateral Meeting" (remarks, Washington, DC, March 31, 2016). The White House Office of the Press Secretary. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/31/remarks-president-obama-president-park-geun-hye-republic-korea-and-prime.

[3]”U.S. to Deploy THAAD Missile Battery to South Korea.” U.S. Department of Defense. July 8, 2016.http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/831630/us-to-deploy-thaad-missile-battery-to-south-korea.

[4]Paul Haenle and Anne Sherman. “The Real Answer to China’s THAAD Dilemma.” September 12, 2016. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/the-real-answer-to-chinas-thaad-dilemma/.

[5] Elizabeth Philipp. “Resuming Negotiations with North Korea.” June 24, 2016. https://www.armscontrol.org/print/7526.

[6] Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu. “The Six Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” September 30, 2013. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593.

[7] “North Korea’s Neighbors Push to Resume Six-Party Talks.” March 26, 2015. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-talks-idUSKBN0MM13420150326.

[8]Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu. “The Six Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” September 30, 2013. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593.

[9] Andrew Quinn, “Insight: Obama’s North Korean Leap of Faith Falls Short,”Reuters, March 30, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-usa-leap-idUSBRE82T06T20120330.

[10] Scott Snyder, "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea," February, 2013, accessed November, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962.

[11] Ankit Panda, “A Great Leap to Nowhere: Remembering the US-North Korea ‘Leap Day’ Deal,” The Diplomat, February 29, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/a-great-leap-to-nowhere-remembering-the-us-north-korea-leap-day-deal/.

[12] “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Arms Control Association. Last updated March 2016. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea.

[13] Bruce Klingner, “North Korea Missile Announcement Undermines Diplomatic Outreach,” March 16, 2012, The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/north-korea-missile-announcement-undermines-diplomatic-outreach.

[14] Daniel R. Russel, Daniel Fried, Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee The Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, Washington D.C., September 28, 2016. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2016/09/262528.htm.

[15] Ibid.

[16] “U.S. Warns of More Antimissile Steps, Pushes China to Back North Korea Sanctions.” October 28, 2016. RT. https://www.rt.com/news/364520-us-china-thaad-sanctions/.