Japan, South Korea, and the NPT
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Since the Treaty opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, a total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty.[1]
East Asia’s two major nuclear powers – Japan and South Korea – became signatories of the NPT in 1976 and 1975 respectively. Though Japan and South Korea are now respected signatories of the NPT, their journeys to achieve such status were festered with resistance, suspicion, and violations. That reminds us to be wary of Japan and South Korea and their nuclear ambitions and capabilities. As these countries face new opportunities and risks in regards to nuclear power and technology, they will express their desires to get concessions from the international nonproliferation regime. The NPT has been an effective mechanism to restrain these countries because of the United States and its desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or weapons technology. The U.S. has an obligation to check Japan and South Korea; however, it is also an opportunity for these countries to be role models for the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament movement of the 21st century.
First, we will look at Japan and South Korea's journey to be NPT signatories. Second, we will look at Japan and South Korea's problems with the NPT. Ultimately, we will see how Japan and South Korea can be not only a responsible signatory of the NPT but also a role model of nonproliferation and disarmament movement of the 21st century.
Japan and South Korea's Journey to the NPT
Japan is the only NPT non-nuclear weapon state that possess full-scale nuclear fuel cycle facilities - enrichment and reprocessing technologies. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was an intense internal debate in the Japanese cabinet whether to sign the NPT or not, in part due to concerns about assuring an access to enrichment and reprocessing technology in order to meet national energy needs. Some ultra-conservatives were also concerned of negative impact of shutting off nuclear weapons from future national security needs by signing the NPT. In 1968, then Prime Minister Sato even commissioned a secret nongovernmental study on the costs and benefits of developing nuclear weapon capabilities (The existence of this report was leaked to the public in 1994). A compromise by the U.S. over enrichment and reprocessing capabilities opened a pathway for Japan to eventually sign the NPT in 1970 and become a signatory in 1976.
South Korea signed the NPT in 1968, but concerns about its security environment in the 1970s led Seoul to consider a nuclear weapon option. President Park Jung-hee of Republic of Korea (ROK) decided to undertake a secret nuclear weapons option under the tight control of the Blue House. However, after the U.S. threatened to withdraw its security guarantees if Seoul did not halt its nuclear weapons program, South Korea finally ratified in 1975.
Japan and South Korea's Problems regarding the NPT
Japan's biggest problems in regards to the NPT are its full-scale nuclear fuel cycle and possession of large stockpile of plutonium. Just like back in the 1970s, Japan is still accused of operating nuclear weapon technologies - enrichment and reprocessing - and stockpiling about 10 tons of plutonium. Japan's unique status as the only NPT non-nuclear weapon state with such capabilities created a difficulty for the U.S. and international community from pursuing nonproliferation policy around the globe as nuclear power-hungry countries such as South Korea cite Japan as an example to get their own concessions in bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation agreements.
In case of South Korea, it is actively seeking to get a permission to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel (SNF). There are numerous reasons. First, South Korea, as a growing nuclear exporter, seeks to achieve an ability to provide potential customers with the full range of services, such as fueling their exported reactors and disposing of the spent fuel that it supplied. Second, South Korea hopes to attain full self-sufficiency for its large nuclear power plants. Finally, South Korea hopes that pyroprocessing will solve its domestic spent-fuel management crisis. However, the U.S. and international community opposes South Korea's desire. It is because of South Korea's past attempt to develop nuclear weapons. In addition, South Korea had numerous past undeclared activities that involved technical skills applicable in a weapons program. These tainted nonproliferation records have made it extremely difficult for South Korea to gain support for acquiring these technologies despite being the responsible NPT signatory for awhile.
Japan and South Korea's Future Role under the NPT
Both Japan and South Korea have reasons to be frustrated with the NPT as they seek to retain or expand their nuclear powers. However, as major nuclear powers, Japan and South Korea are being closely observed by many other aspiring nuclear powers as their role models in pursuing their nuclear ambitions and policies. Below are Japan and South Korea's future role under the NPT and why they should adopt these roles:
First, Japan and South Korea should halt their ambitions to pursue or retain reprocessing technology. Yes, these countries have their reasons to desire the reprocessing technology. However, it is proven by numerous academic studies that reprocessing is not financially and environmentally beneficial as nuclear industry advocates. Reprocessing is a more expensive solution to manage SNF, creates larger amount of SNF than closed fuel cycle, and also increases the cost of electricity. In addition, Japan and South Korea can be a forerunner of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts by voluntarily giving up their desire of reprocessing capability.
Second, Japan and South Korea should once again reaffirm their commitments to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Japan has its "Three Nuclear Principles" and South Korea has a "Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." However, these commitments are decades-old. Both countries can reaffirm their commitment to the NPT and its objectives with concrete policy actions, such as abandoning reprocessing capability and voluntarily raising their safeguards of nuclear facilities.
Japan and South Korea may see the NPT as an obstacle toward their ambition to be nuclear powerhouse. However, they still thrived and enjoyed the benefits of nuclear technology under the shadow of the NPT. Strengthening the NPT and supporting its mission will benefit Japan and South Korea in long-term as a responsible signatory of the NPT and guardian of nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
Endnotes
[1] “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Accessed on December 3, 2016, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.