North Korean Tests Spur South Korean Debate
North Korea’s 5th nuclear weapons test, conducted September 9th of this year, gave birth to South Korea's highest volume of calls for nuclear weapons to date.
The loudest calls for nuclear armament come from members of the Saenuri party, the ruling conservative party of the South Korean parliament. Following the September test of the misnamed "hydrogen" bomb, thirty-one Saenuri Party members signed a letter calling for South Korea to take all measures, including nuclear armament, to defeat North Korea.[1] The pro-nuclear faction of the Saenuri party believe that South Korea should not rely on others, namely the United States, for their security. Operating from a position of skepticism, many, like former Saenuri party policy leader Kim Jong-hoon doubt the willingness of the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations should conflict break out.[2] Outside of politics, Cheong Seong-Chang of the Sejong Institute argues that nuclearization actually has more benefits than consequences.[3] Non-governmental organization experts and editorial columnists alike now feel a South Korea with nuclear weapons is the only way to defeat an increasingly aggressive North Korea.
South Korea has pursued nuclear armament before – under former dictator Park Chung-hee. To do so again would likely lead to isolation from the international community. If the Republic of Korea (ROK) chooses to manufacture nuclear weapons it would be in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which it signed in 1968 as well as the 1992 “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula” which permanently bans nuclear weapons on the peninsula. Such a departure from the established 40+ year policy of nonproliferation would incur sanctions, both financial and political, from supranational institutions like the UN. In fact, a foundational reason for the initial sanctions against North Korea was their exit from the NPT. Their continued refusal to end their weapons program perpetuates and makes these sanctions more severe.[4]
Not only would nuclear proliferation in the ROK lead to international isolation and sanctions, but a nuclearized Korean peninsula could lead to an arms race with Japan, causing a domino effect on the wider global nonproliferation order.[5]
Proponents of nuclear weapons routinely suggest three main options for South Korea:
Reintroduce U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the country.
Acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
Produce nuclear weapons domestically.
The return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula is seen as a bargaining chip to use against North Korea. Proponents believe that by threatening to once again welcome American nukes, South Korea would be able to obtain real concessions and an agreed verifiable North Korean pledge to permanently denuclearize.
The ROK has long argued for indigenous nuclear reprocessing and enrichment technology, but has been routinely blocked from pursuing either due to their civilian nuclear technology agreements with the United States. National Assembly Representative Kim Jong-hoon argues “in preparation against Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear arms, [South Korea] should at least have capabilities sufficient enough to build nukes at any time.”[6] This position is not unpopular as it is also seen as a solution to the South’s spent nuclear fuel problem from its 24 civilian nuclear reactors. On June 15, 2015, the ROK and the United States signed a renewed 123 agreement that offers pathways towards enrichment and reprocessing, by subjecting all future discussions/requests to a high-level bilateral management mechanism set up by the agreement. The new agreement does not meet the much lauded "Gold Standard", but given American nonproliferation policy it is highly unlikely that the United States will agree to anything that represents a drastic departure from the “Gold Standard” of no reprocessing and no enrichment. It’s not yet known if this agreement presents a pathway to opportunity or a path to nowhere.
The final option floated by politicians, academics, and columnists skips right to the end. “If North Korea becomes a nuclear-armed state and its adversary does not own nuclear power, then the non-nuclear state becomes a slave or hostage of the nuclear state. This is a basic principle of international politics,” said Song Dae-sung a professor at Kunkook University in Seoul.[7] This is a prevalent and growing line of thought throughout the ROK. People from all walks of life have grown increasingly frustrated with the North’s mastery of brinkmanship and Seoul’s inability to stop them. This option is seen as an opportunity to right the asymmetric relationship of the two Koreas.
Calls by public figures and some in the media following a DPRK nuclear test are not abnormal, what is abnormal is the sheer number of such calls and their persistence following the September 9th test. In 3 years’ time, from 2013 to the most recent nuclear test in September 2016, the amount of print media coverage dedicated to the issue of a nuclearized South Korea doubled.[8] The growth in featured stories on South Korea’s three major broadcasting companies (KBS, SBS, MBC) mirrored the observed changes in print media coverage.[9] More than that, the media coverage in 2016 has been fair and balanced, offering an almost even number of stories from both perspectives.[10] Another change is public opinion. The majority of Koreans are still in favor of nuclear weapons 54% to 38% against, according to a Gallup Korea poll.[11] What is not often discussed is that that number is down from 2013 when 64% of the population was in favor of South Korea becoming a nuclear weapons state.[12] 2016 was an election year, which could partially account for the increase in nuclear weapons discussions, as politicians try to rally their bases. The lack of a correlation between media chatter and public opinion may point to the hollowness of any South Korean calls for major disruptions in the current security status quo.
No one argues that it is the Republic of Korea’s sovereign right to decide whether or not to join the club of nuclear weapons states. What is important is that, South Korea, for the sake of the peninsula and regional security makes the decision with clear eyes, fully aware of what it’s getting into.
Endnotes
[1](www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. "Calls Grow for South Korea to Consider Deploying Nuclear Weapons | Asia | DW.COM | 13.09.2016." DW.COM. Accessed November 26, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/calls-grow-for-south-korea-to-consider-deploying-nuclear-weapons/a-19547289.
[2]Toby Dalton, Byun Sunggee, Lee Sang Tae. "South Korea Debates Nuclear Options." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2016.
[3]Ibid.
[4]"South Korean Nuclear Proponents: Conventional Deterrence Is Failing." VOA. Accessed November 27, 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-nuclear-proponents-say-conventional-detterence-is-failing/3480128.html.
[5] (www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. "Calls Grow for South Korea to Consider Deploying Nuclear Weapons | Asia | DW.COM | 13.09.2016." DW.COM. Accessed November 26, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/calls-grow-for-south-korea-to-consider-deploying-nuclear-weapons/a-19547289.
[6]Toby Dalton, Byun Sunggee, Lee Sang Tae. "South Korea Debates Nuclear Options." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2016.
[7]"South Korean Nuclear Proponents: Conventional Deterrence Is Failing." VOA. Accessed November 27, 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-nuclear-proponents-say-conventional-detterence-is-failing/3480128.html.
[8]Toby Dalton, Byun Sunggee, Lee Sang Tae. "South Korea Debates Nuclear Options." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Nov. 2016.
[9]Ibid.
[10]Ibid.
[11]한국갤럽 데일리 오피니언 제194호. 2016년1월6일. (Gallup Korea.)
[12]Ibid.