Regional Consequences of a Nuclearized East Asia
On July 25, 1969, President Nixon announced with no advance warning to the country’s allies that, “as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense…the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian allies themselves.” Washington followed this rhetoric by abruptly withdrawing the Seventh Infantry Division from South Korea in mid-1971 despite the protest of President Park Chung-Hee. In addition, the stunning and unanticipated Sino-American rapprochement of 1971-72 further fueled South Korea’s feeling of insecurity.
In response, President Park ordered the establishment of a secret nuclear weapons program in 1970. The Weapons Exploitation Committee under the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) made a unanimous recommendation to President Park to proceed with nuclear weapons program and projected the development of nuclear weapons to take six to ten years with an estimated cost between US $1.5 billion and $2 billion.
South Korea’s ambition was halted by Washington’s indirect and direct pressure. Washington intervened with Paris, Brussels, and Ottawa to prevent any sales of sophisticated nuclear technology, such as spent fuel reprocessing facility, mixed-oxide reprocessing laboratory and heavy-water (CANDU) reactor, to South Korea. However, South Korea ultimately terminated nuclear weapons program when Washington threatened to end the bilateral relationship. As U.S. ambassador to South Korea Richard Sneider warned President Park in late 1975, “Far more than our nuclear support is at stake here…If the ROKG [South Korean government] proceeds as it has indicated to date, [the] whole range of security and political relationships between the U.S. and ROK will be affected.” Fearful of immediate abandonment and distant from producing nuclear weapons, South Korea completely terminated the project.
In 1970s and 1980s, Taiwan also desired to develop nuclear weapons due to unfavorable security developments. In 1971, the United Nations recognized the PRC as the legitimate sovereign of China and expelled Taiwan – the nationalist regime – from the seat. The shock of President Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing and growing U.S.-PRC strategic rapprochement further alarmed Taiwan. Finally, Taiwan viewed the sudden normalization of U.S.-PRC relation in 1979 as a deep betrayal, cementing Taiwanese public’s mistrust of the U.S. However, similarly to the case of South Korea, Taiwan’s nuclear weapon program was detected and crushed when Washington threatened to cut all bilateral ties with Taipei if further progress in nuclear weapons program was detected.
Key lessons from these two cases of nuclear weapons program in East Asia is that first, American allies of the region will desire nuclear weapons if their securities are threatened or no longer guaranteed by their relationships with the U.S. Second, the U.S. carries a weight in halting its allies from pursuing nuclear weapons. As a result, my analysis is, nuclear proliferation of East Asia will only occur if and when the U.S. no longer functions as a custodian of nonproliferation and stability of the region.
If the U.S. surrenders its current role in East Asia, following are likely nuclear proliferation scenarios in East Asia:
Japan develops nuclear weapons to counterbalance and guarantee its security against the PRC. When the U.S. exits East Asia, then there will be a massive power vacuum, and PRC and Japan will contend to fill it. An absence of nuclear weapons will work as serious deficiency for Japan in vying for influence and power in East Asia. In addition, Japan will also seek to build nuclear deterrence so that the PRC will not be able to coerce Japan or invade the disputed territories.
South Korea develops nuclear weapons to guarantee its security against North Korea. The U.S. military presence and extension of “nuclear umbrella” on the Korean Peninsula have prevented South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. With no such safety nets, South Korea will be vulnerable from North Korea’s conventional military and nuclear aggressions.
Taiwan develops nuclear weapons if anti-PRC and pro-independence fervor prevails over “one China” future under the PRC. The strategic ambiguity of the U.S. prevented the PRC from invading Taiwan and Taiwan from declaring independence from the PRC. If the U.S. no longer stays as a meditator of two entities, then Taiwan will likely to declare independence and in order to guarantee its autonomy, it will seek nuclear weapons.
Regionally, East Asia will be consumed in nuclear security dilemma, where the number and capability of nuclear weapons and delivery methods will get out of control, thereby increasing the risk of conventional war, limited nuclear war, breakdown of regional economic cooperation, and shattering of any hope of future regional economic and political integration.
Globally, nuclear weapons programs of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan will mean a death of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and many other nonproliferation mechanisms and treaties. Just like when India and Pakistan successfully tested nuclear weapons in 1970s, success of East Asian countries’ nuclear weapons programs can lead to a global wave of nuclear armament.
East Asia is a “powder keg” of nuclear proliferation. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been possessing capable nuclear arsenal for decades. North Korea is believed to have working nuclear bombs after five underground tests. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have a varying degree of peaceful nuclear technology, which can be converted into nuclear weapon program in short period. Therefore, it will be crucial for the U.S. to continue to its role as a custodian of nuclear nonproliferation and stability of East Asia. Disengagement and negligence of regional dynamic cannot be tolerated. Preservation of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as non-nuclear weapon states must be prioritized in future nonproliferation efforts and policy. Most importantly, the U.S. needs to guarantee its security commitment to these countries in order to prevent any attempts of developing and possessing nuclear weapons.