Would Nuclearized East Asia Trigger an International Domino Effect?
The outcome of the 2016 United States Presidential election raises questions about President-elect Donald Trump’s East Asia policy and its consequences regarding nuclear proliferation. His isolationist comments and statements that South Korea and Japan should develop a nuclear weapon could put an end to U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the region and trigger further proliferation. While it is is unlikely that the weaponization of South Korea or Japan would cause an international proliferation domino effect, U.S. isolationism might cause latent nuclear states with hostile neighbors to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. A nuclearized East Asia paired with an increase in U.S. isolationism can cause an international domino effect for latent nuclear countries. “It would be difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area, were North Korea to conduct another test”, the President of South Korea Park-Geun Hye is quoted as saying. [1]
First, let us examine the reasons for a nuclearized East Asia to not cause an international domino effect. The proliferation domino effect is typically seen in a regional context when one rival state is weaponized, not on an extra-regional level. For example, South Korea’s motivation for a nuclear weapon is a hostile and weaponized North Korea. Meanwhile, other developed Asian states might consider their nuclear options as well as a deterrent to an increasingly aggressive China. However, the economic and historical ties between those countries are indeed just regional. A nuclearized East Asia would not have a significant effect in South America or Africa for example because their futures are barely intertwined with the East Asian regional security calculus. One country developing a nuclear weapon in a particular part of the world doesn’t mean far-away states will seek the bomb as well. Henry Sokolski, director of NPEC, was quoted in The Diplomat as arguing, “that the more sanguine views of nuclear future in the Asia-Pacific fail to fully explore the regional insecurities that arise with threatened nuclear weapons breakouts or ramp-ups.” [2] Indeed, it would seem that the proliferation domino effect threat seems to be contained within a particular region.
International proliferation domino effect is also unlikely because obtaining and maintaining nuclear weapons capabilities is expensive and dangerous. Without an existing nuclear energy program with dual-use technology, conventional missile weapons delivery capability, and the requisite expertise in metallurgy, nuclear engineering, etc., it would take a significant amount of time and resources to build up the basics before even developing a nuclear weapon. In addition, fissile material is difficult to protect from diversion or theft and ensuring adequate physical protection is expensive. A paper in 2013 cited threats or attempts to blow up or damage reactors in Argentina, Russia, some European states, South Africa and South Korea, showcasing the difficulty in securing nuclear facilities from non-state actors. [3] States that did not choose to pursue nuclear weapons have no obvious reason to go back on their previous commitment to relinquish weapons programs unless they face a direct security threat from a nuclearized East Asian country. South Korea and Japan understand the enormous costs inherent in weaponization to their reputations in the international field, and political, security and economic ties with the U.S. and China.
The international community overwhelmingly views North Korea as a rogue nation that frequently acts in irrational ways. A big concern for the United States is the question of which state or non-state actors might the Pyongyang leadership share their nuclear weapons technology with. It also raises the question of whether it would cause other rogue states to be emboldened by North Korea’s success, which was able to draw the attention of the international community with its nuclearization efforts. Having an irrational leader as the head of a state of a decision making apparatus allows for the state to channel its limited resources towards nuclear weapons. The weakening of the international nonproliferation regime caused by U.S. isolationism provides a viable defense reason for latent nuclear states to develop a nuclear bomb. U.S. extended deterrence keeps states all over the world from developing nuclear weapons as a response to the threat from more powerful regional hegemons. It would likely help keep proliferation from spreading beyond East Asia. However, the most likely scenario for Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons would be due to a lack of faith in U.S. extended deterrence or a new U.S. administration’s policy to not extend deterrence without significant monetary compensation. South Korea and Japan have not pursued their own nuclear weapons, “largely thanks to extensive U.S. efforts to dissuade them.” [4]
Without the guarantee of U.S. military backing, small states with few powerful allies and an already nuclearized hostile neighbor have a security reason to pursue a nuclear weapons program of their own. Eastern Europe is facing an increasingly aggressive Russia, South Asia is cautious of a rising China with a rapidly modernizing and growing military, and countries in the Middle East are concerned about either Iran’s developing capability to produce nuclear weapons or Israel’s existing nuclear weapons. If international nonproliferation norms are given up, fearful states might want to explore the possibility of weaponizing. [5] States facing rivals with superior conventional military power have a good incentive to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent and negotiating tool. In this way, a nuclearized East Asia would trigger international proliferation in latent nuclear states faced with an uncertain security future.
Whether you agree or not with President-elect Donald Trump’s statements that East Asia should arm itself, a look at its effects in the realm of international proliferation is useful. An article in The Diplomat compares the faltering of nonproliferation to opening up of a Pandora’s box because, “it would critically undermine U.S. hegemony in this part of the world and upturn global non-proliferation efforts”. [6]
Endnotes
[1] Zachary Keck, “N. Korea Won’t Cause a Nuclear Domino in Asia (But China Might),” May 31, 2014. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/n-korea-wont-cause-a-nuclear-domino-in-asia-but-china-might/.
[2] Francis Sempa, “Nuclear Instability in the Asia-Pacific Region,” February 7, 2016, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/nuclear-instability-in-the-asia-pacific-region/.
[3] Lara Kirkham and Alan J. Kuperman, “Protecting U.S. Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Re-assessing the Current ‘Design Basis Threat’ Approach,” Working Paper # 1, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (NPPP), University of Texas at Austin, August 15, 2013.
[4] Johan Bergenas, “The Nuclear Domino Myth,” August 31, 2010, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2010-08-31/nuclear-domino-myth.
[5] Without an existing nuclear energy program with dual-use technology, conventional missile weapons delivery capability, and the requisite expertise in metallurgy, nuclear engineering, etc., it would take a significant amount of time and resources to build up the basics before even developing a nuclear weapon. States with a conventional military and expertise in nuclear energy are more likely to weaponize in response to a nuclearized East Asia.
[6] Philip Iglauer, “Nuclear Weapons for South Korea,” August 14, 2014. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/nuclear-weapons-for-south-korea/.